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What to do in the first hour after a Microsoft 365 account gets phished

Short answer

Use the first 60 minutes in this order: revoke the person's sessions, reset the password, then look for what the attacker changed, such as inbox rules, extra sign-in methods and forwarding. A new password alone doesn't kick an attacker out, because Microsoft's own incident write-ups say a stolen session keeps working after the reset.

A tall building with a microsoft logo on top of it
Photo by Simon Ray on Unsplash

Key takeaways

  • Cut the session before you reset anything. A new password doesn't end a stolen session.
  • Check three places the attacker leaves things behind: inbox rules, sign-in methods and mail forwarding.
  • Warn the account's contacts early. A hijacked mailbox gets used to phish the next company.
  • Aim to do the sign-out in the first five minutes and the rest inside the hour.

Someone on your team clicked a link, typed their Microsoft 365 password, and got a sign-in screen that looked a little off. Now you're here.

Good. Looking this up fast is the right instinct, and the next hour matters a lot more than the next day. This is the order we'd work in.

What the attack looks like from the user's side

It rarely looks like an attack. In the 2023 campaign Microsoft documented, the email came from a vendor the company already trusted, whose own account had been compromised. It carried a link to what looked like a fax document hosted on Canva. The page showed a fake OneDrive preview and then sent people to a spoofed Microsoft sign-in page.

After that the person typed a password, got an MFA prompt, approved it, and landed on a document. Nothing seemed wrong.

That's why "I didn't click anything weird" is not good evidence. Ask the user what they signed into and when, and don't lean on how suspicious it felt.

Why changing the password isn't enough

Most people reset the password first. It feels like the obvious fix, and it isn't enough. Across the attacks Microsoft describes, the fake sign-in page captures the signed-in session as well as the password, and the attacker replays that session later from a different IP address. Microsoft's wording is blunt: since the sign-in session is compromised, password reset is not an effective solution.

So order matters. Cut the session first, then change the password. Do it the other way round and the attacker can stay signed in while you think the job is done.

The first hour, in order

  1. 01

    Sign the user out everywhere

    In the Microsoft 365 or Entra admin center, open the user and revoke their sessions ("Sign out of all sessions"). This is the step that ends a stolen session. Do it before anything else.

  2. 02

    Reset the password and block sign-in for now

    Set a new password the user hasn't used anywhere else. Block their sign-in while you check the rest, so nobody can slip back in mid-cleanup. It's a 20-minute inconvenience for one person. We'd take that over an argument later.

  3. 03

    Remove sign-in methods they didn't add

    Open the user's authentication methods. If there's a phone number or app they don't recognize, remove it. In Microsoft's 2023 case the attacker added a phone-based one-time code as a new MFA method so they could get back in.

  4. 04

    Look for mailbox rules and forwarding

    Check the mailbox for rules the user didn't create, especially ones that delete mail, move it to Archive or RSS folders, or mark it read. Check the forwarding settings too. Delete anything suspicious.

  5. 05

    Tell the people who got mail from the account

    Pull the sent items for the time since the sign-in and send a short note to those recipients: don't open the link, and tell us if you did. Do this early. Waiting a week means more people clicked.

  6. 06

    Search every mailbox for the same message

    The email that fooled one person was almost certainly sent to others. Search for it by sender and subject and remove it, then ask anyone who clicked to tell you.

  7. 07

    Check for money moving

    If the account belongs to someone in finance or sales, look for invoices, bank-detail changes or payment requests sent from it. If money moved, call the bank first and then sort out the paperwork.

What attackers usually leave behind

Microsoft's write-ups of real campaigns read like a checklist for this cleanup. After adding that one-time code in the 2023 case, the attacker created an inbox rule that moved all incoming mail to the Archive folder and marked it read. A 2026 campaign used a rule that deleted incoming mail and marked it read. Different rule, same job: keep the real owner from seeing replies from people who got suspicious.

Phishing emails sent from one hijacked mailbox (at least)
  • 2026 SharePoint campaign600 emails
  • 2023 fake-fax campaign16,000 emails

Source: Microsoft Security blog, 2026 and 2023 incident write-ups (linked in Sources); Microsoft reports "more than" these counts

The mailbox then turns into a launch pad. Microsoft counted more than 16,000 phishing emails sent to the victim's contacts in the 2023 case and more than 600 in the 2026 one. Some of the people who received them were phished too. That's why the note to your clients and vendors goes out in the first hour, not the first week.

Where to look, and what you're looking for
PlaceWhat to look forWhy it matters
Sign-in logSign-ins from a new IP address or country, close to the time of the clickMicrosoft's cases show the stolen session replayed from a different IP address
Mailbox rulesRules that delete mail, move it to Archive or mark it readHides replies from people who got suspicious
Authentication methodsA phone number or app the user didn't addGives the attacker a way back in
Sent and Deleted itemsBulk mail to contacts, deleted bounce-backs and out-of-office repliesShows how far it spread
Forwarding settingsForwarding to an outside addressCopies everything to the attacker quietly
Rows based on the behavior described in Microsoft's 2023 and 2026 incident write-ups, plus common forwarding abuse.

What to check once the fire is out

  • The account's sign-in log for sign-ins from places the person has never been.
  • Sent Items and Deleted Items. Microsoft's cases show attackers deleting bounce-backs and out-of-office replies, and answering people who questioned the emails, to hide what's going on.
  • Any shared files or links the account sent out while it was compromised.
  • Whether the user reused that password anywhere else. If so, change it there too.

The first week, once the account is clean

Once the account is clean, the work is making sure the next one doesn't go the same way. We'd go through this list in the following few days:

  1. Require a fresh MFA check before anyone can add or change a sign-in method. Microsoft suggests requiring an MFA re-challenge for MFA updates as a default.
  2. Turn on risk-based Conditional Access and continuous access evaluation if your licenses include them. Both are on Microsoft's list of mitigations.
  3. Move admins and finance staff to phishing-resistant sign-in, such as FIDO2 security keys.
  4. Run a short phishing exercise for the whole office. The vendor-email trick works because people trust the sender, and a drill with that exact trick is more useful than a generic one. We run security awareness training for that.
  5. Write down what happened: the time of the click, the time you cut the session, who you told. Your cyber insurer or auditor will ask.

Catching it sooner next time

The painful part of these incidents is the gap between the sign-in and someone noticing. A mailbox rule that hides replies is built to stretch that gap. We think the gap is the real problem, more than the click.

Our own setup closes it from two sides. We run 24/7 threat detection and response for computers and Microsoft 365 email, powered by Huntress, and an on-call technician handles urgent issues after hours (emergency fees may apply). You can read how that works on our identity threat detection page and our managed detection and response page. If the terms are new, antivirus vs EDR vs MDR explains the difference.

Whether multi-factor authentication would have stopped this attack in the first place is its own question, and the answer is more interesting than yes or no. We wrote it up in does MFA stop phishing?

Questions people ask

Do I have to tell anyone outside the company?

At minimum, tell the people the account emailed. If the mailbox held client or patient data, talk to whoever handles your compliance or cyber insurance before you decide anything else. Your contracts and regulators set the rules there, not us.

Is it safe to let the person keep working?

Once the sessions are revoked, the password is reset and the sign-in methods and mailbox rules are checked, yes. Have them sign in fresh, and keep an eye on the account for the next few days.

Can I just turn on MFA and be done?

MFA is worth having, but this exact attack gets around the common kinds. The fake page asks for the code and passes it along. See does MFA stop phishing? for which kinds hold up.

How long should I watch the account afterwards?

Watch it closely for a couple of weeks. Check the sign-in log and mailbox rules every few days at first, then weekly. If anything new shows up, treat the account as compromised again and start from step one.

Sources

  1. Microsoft Security blog: Detecting and mitigating a multi-stage AiTM phishing and BEC campaign (2023)
  2. Microsoft Security blog: Resurgence of a multi-stage AiTM phishing and BEC campaign abusing SharePoint (2026)
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Written by

Neteam SolutionsManaged IT and cybersecurity, NYC since 2001

Neteam Solutions Inc. runs IT departments and security for businesses in New York City, Nassau County and northeast New Jersey from offices in Astoria and Williston Park.

Last updated October 28, 2026